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Denmark 
Professor, PhD Jane Bolander, University of Southern Denmark and Associate Professor, 
PhD Jacob Graff Nielsen, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen 
 
Questionnaire ‘The Burden of Proof in Tax Matters’, EATLP Conference, May 2011, 
Uppsala, Sweden 
 
Prepared by: Gerard Meussen, Klaus-Dieter Drüen, Börje Leidhammar, Giuseppe Marino 
 
How the burden of proof is allocated is an important issue in legal disputes concerning tax 
matters. Courts often hear tax cases in which the allocation of the burden of proof is an 
essential element for deciding the case. But national tax legislators also take a special interest 
in how the burden of proof is allocated. In abusive situations the burden of proof is often 
shifted to the taxpayer. This thereby strengthens the position of the tax administration.  
In European tax cases the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that when a taxpayer 
provides proof in a tax case, this may only take place on the assumption that the taxpayer is 
able to do so without encountering undue administrative constraints.  
And in international tax matters such as transfer pricing arrangements, the burden of proof is 
also very important. In such cases the burden of proof lies primarily with the taxpayer and he 
generally has to comply with severe documentation requirements. 
 
The questionnaire, as a starting point for the coming EATLP Conference, looks at various 
aspects of the burden of proof at four different levels: 
1. National concepts 
2. The burden of proof in anti-abuse provisions 
3. The burden of proof and European tax law 
4. The burden of proof in cross-border situations (international tax law)  
 
Part A: National concepts 
 
1. General rule on the burden of proof 
In Sweden like many other countries, the general rule concerning the division of the burden of 
proof is that the tax administration has to prove the income-side and that the taxpayer has to 
prove the cost-side. This rule has been established in tax practice and is based on the idea that 
each party must provide the evidence that is easiest for it to gather. Usually, it is easier for the 
tax administration to prove that income has been received and for the taxpayer to prove that 
costs have been made than the other way around. 
 
Question: Does such a general rule exist in your legal system? Is it based on the law or on tax 
practice? If such a general rule does not exist, how is the burden of proof allocated? Do 
different rules apply for proceedings in the tax administration, the tax courts or the criminal 
courts? 
 
JGN 
A Danish saying in procedural law goes: “Three things are needed to win a law suit: 
Evidence, evidence and evidence”. In view of this recognition, it is considered a bit of a 
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paradox in Danish legal discourse that legal study of proof and evidence plays a minor role as 
a part of Danish law education.1 
 
Before turning the attention to legal discourse on proof and evidence in Danish tax cases, it is 
necessary to give a brief introduction to the general theory regarding firstly the procedural 
regulation about evidence and means of evidence and secondly the assessment of evidence in 
Denmark. The first subject primarily concerns practical provisions on for instance witnesses, 
duty to give evidence, presentation of documentation and the evidence-related rights of the 
parties to a given case. Provisions on evidence are found in the Danish Administration of 
Justice Act (AJA)2 and related case law when it comes to evidence in court cases while 
administrative procedure are governed by other general principles in administrative law and – 
in case of administrative tax complaints – by the Danish Tax Administration Act (TAA)3 that 
has relevance to evidence and burden of proof in administrative tax cases.  
 
It is a general and fundamental legal principle in Danish legal discourse that the assessment of 
evidence is free, which means that it is up to the courts or administrative tribunals to assess 
whether a fact is considered sufficiently documented or not whereas it is up to the parties to 
produce the necessary evidence.4  
 
Legal court proceedings – civil cases 
Legal proceedings in the Danish courts of law are generally dived into two categories: 
Dispositive cases and non-dispositive cases. As a rule, legal court proceedings are dispositive 
which means that parties of a lawsuit have the right to define the questions or substance-
matter – in form of claims, allegations and submissions – which the judges can decide on, cf. 
AJA sec. 338. Subsequently, the Danish courts of law cannot decide on questions in legal 
proceedings which are not worded in a claim, allegation or submission by the parties of a 
conflict. The negotiation principle in Danish legal discourse concerning legal proceedings 
describes the parties’ elucidation of the facts of the case and the procedure’s primary nature as 
a negotiation between the parties.5 The negotiation principle does not, however, limit the 
court’s application of legal rules including interpretation as described by the following 
declaration: Narra mihi factum, narro tibi jus.6 While the principle of negotiation charges the 
parties of a case with the wording of claims, allegations and submissions, it does not 
automatically mean that the burden of proof concerning all the facts of the allegation rests on 
the party who has set forth the claim etc. Moreover, the principle of negotiation is not without 
exception as the principle is supplemented by the court’s duty to provide guidance and is 
furthermore limited in non-dispositive cases such as for instance affiliation proceedings and 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Henrik Zahle: Bevisret og oversigt, (1994), p. 13. 
2
 Consolidated Act no. 1053 of 29 October 2009 as amended. 
3
 Consolidated Act no. 907 of 28 August 2006 as amended. 
4
 Cf. Bernhard Gomard & Michael Kistrup: Civilprocessen, 6. ed., (2007), p. 25. 
5
 Cf. ibidem, p. 500 ff.  
6
 Tell me the facts and I’ll tell you the law. 
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custody cases.7 The courts also to some extent have means to induce parties to elaborate on 
claims and express an opinion on any factual or legal matter cf. AJA, sec. 339.  
 
Tax cases are dispositive cases covered by the negotiation principle, but the rules laid down in 
TAA and general principles in administrative law may limit the negotiation principle when 
the tax authorities act as a party in a legal proceeding. Subsequently, the court’s means of 
inducing the parties of the case by questioning to introduce or present evidence in an 
expedient manner is more conspicuous in cases to which the administration is a party.8 
Moreover, it is assumed that the courts to some extent may modify the parties’ claims, 
allegations and submissions if the courts cannot by means of questioning ensure that the case 
is decided in accordance with essential public considerations, cf. UfR 1988.1 H.  
 
One aspect of the negotiation principle is considered to be the principle of contradiction 
according to which the parties of a legal court proceeding are entitled to be informed about 
pleas, production of evidence of the opposite party and to state the party’s point of view on 
any material that can form the basis of the court’s ruling. 
 
The negotiation principle also plays an important role when it comes to evidence. The Danish 
courts of law do not collect and present evidence as this is the prerogative of the parties of the 
legal proceeding. The courts may, however, preclude evidence if such evidence is deemed to 
be unnecessary, cf. AJA, sec. 341, and request that a party produces evidence if the facts of 
the case cannot be elucidated without such evidence, cf. AJA, sec. 339 (3).9 If a party does not 
comply with the court’s request for production of evidence, the court may regard this to be in 
favour of the opposite party as part of the court’s assessment of evidence, cf. AJA, sec.344 
(3), unless the party is unable to comply with the court’s request due to legal or factual 
reasons.   
  
Legal court proceedings – criminal cases 
The assessment of evidence in Denmark in criminal proceedings is based on a fundamental 
principle that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution; In dubio pro reo. This is also the 
case in tax cases that result in criminal charges against a taxpayer. As a consequence, the 
judges on the one hand have to be convinced that the accused is guilty to convict the accused, 
and the prosecution on the other hand has to support the judge’s conviction by producing 
sufficient evidence. The concept of mens rea or guilty mind in Danish legal discourse is 
closely related to the burden of proof in criminal cases; a broad definition of mens rea may 
lighten the prosecution’s burden of proof while a strict definition may make the burden of 
proof stricter. In Denmark, mens rea in criminal cases includes dolus eventualis as the lowest 
threshold of criminal intent meaning that the prosecution may prove criminal intent even 
                                                 
7
 As burden of proof in non-dispositive cases is not relevant in tax law cases, non-dispositive cases will not be 
described further. 
8
 Cf. Bernhard Gomard & Michael Kistrup: Civilprocessen, 6. ed., (2007), p. 511. 
9
 Cf. Also UfR 1981.101 H and UfR 1982.171 H. 
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though the perpetrator did not intend to conduct the criminal act and did not to a high degree 
of probability belief his or her acts to be criminal, but nevertheless would not have acted 
otherwise. Dolus eventualis also covers a situation where the accused did not to a high degree 
of probability belief his or her acts to be criminal, but did realize the possibility of the 
criminal nature of his or her acts, cf. UfR 1979.577 H.  
 
Complaints against the tax authorities 
In administrative complaints procedures in Denmark, the principle of inquisitorial procedure 
applies.10 That is why it is the obligation of the tax administration to procure the information 
that is necessary to decide the complaint including both information of a factual and legal 
nature. As mentioned above the inquisitorial procedure principle in administrative complaints 
also plays a role in legal proceedings where for instance the tax authorities act as a party. 
 
General rule on burden of proof in Danish tax law 
As a rule, the burden of proof rests on the party that makes a claim which affects or obligates 
another party. The burden of proof in a complaints procedure or legal proceeding also 
depends on the wording of the relevant statutory provision on which the claim of a party is 
based. As far as the question of burden of proof regarding the income-side concerns the 
phrasing of the Danish State Tax Act sec. 4 operates with a very broad definition of income. 
As a starting point, the burden of proof regarding the existence of taxable income that can be 
allocated to the taxpayer rests on the tax authorities. However, when the tax authorities have 
established these facts, it is up to the taxpayer to prove the income’s eventual exemption from 
taxation. On the basis of the broad definition of income pursuant to the Danish State Tax Act, 
sec 4 and the taxpayers’ obligation to file a self assessment tax return it could be argued that 
the taxpayer also has to participate actively in procuring information about taxable income at 
first hand. This does not mean, however, that the burden of proof for income taxation rests on 
the taxpayers in general. Moreover, the inquisitorial procedure principle generally requires 
that the tax authorities procure necessary information. In summary, the question about burden 
of proof apparently is a bit more complex in Danish legal discourse compared to Swedish 
legal discourse, but the end result resembles the Swedish: As a rule, the burden of proof on 
the income-side rests on the tax authorities. 
 
In comparison, it is for the taxpayer to prove the existence of a deductable cost, which is 
primarily based on the wording of e.g. the Danish State Tax Act, sec. 6. This provision lays 
down a number of conditions of deductions including a close connection to income-related 
activity and consequently the taxpayer has to prove that these conditions are met. Moreover, it 
is easier for the taxpayer to prove the existence of expenses that are related to income-creating 
activity. 
 
                                                 
10
 Cf. Hans Henrik Bonde Eriksen, Susanne Dahl and Poul Bostrup: Skatte- og afgiftsproces, (2010), 3. ed., p. 
240. In Danish legal discourse this principle is called: Officialmaksimen. 
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In general, the burden of proof regarding deductions rests on the taxpayer, while the 
inquisitorial procedure principle charges the tax authorities with assisting with necessary 
factual or legal information. 
 
2. Variations on the general rule depending on time period or if it is claimed that the 
taxpayer has submitted false/incorrect information 
In Sweden, the general rule is the one mentioned above. This rule is applicable only in the 
ordinary tax procedure. The ordinary tax procedure lasts for a period of one year after the tax 
year (in other words, two years after the income year). After that period the tax administration 
has to make its decision according to the special rules of additional taxation. In case of an 
additional tax assessment the tax administration has to prove that the taxpayer has provided 
incorrect/false information (or omitted or failed to provide information that he is obliged to 
provide). Accordingly, during the tax procedure with regard to the additional tax assessment 
the tax administration bears the burden of proof for both the income- and the cost-side. The 
purpose of this rule is to provide legal certainty/security when a tax decision is made after the 
ordinary period of time has lapsed. 
 
Question: In your country, do different rules of burden of proof apply depending on the period 
of time in which the decision on the tax dispute is being made? Where does the burden of 
proof lie where a tax penalty is being imposed? 
 
JB 
As mentioned above has the tax administration the burden of proof concerning the income-
side and the taxpayer has the burden of proof concerning the cost-side. The ordinary tax 
period normally last to 1 May in the fourth year after the end of the relevant income year, cf. 
ATA, sec. 26. But if the tax administration wants to suggest changes for personal taxpayer 
with simple economical conditions this has to be done before the 1 July in the second calendar 
year after the end of the relevant income year, cf. Ministerial Order no. 1095 of 15 November 
2005. After that period the tax administration can only suggest a tax reduction of the tax 
assessment. 
 
After the ordinary tax period the tax decision can only be changed in accordance with the 
special rules of extraordinary assessment. One situation where the tax decision can be 
changed is if the taxpayer or someone on behalf of the taxpayer deliberately or with gross 
negligence has caused the tax administration to make an assessment on a false or incomplete 
foundation, cf. ATA, sec. 27 (1) (5).  
 
The tax authority has to prove that the taxpayer has been responsible for this incorrect 
foundation and consequently the burden of proof for both the income and for expenses or lack 
of deductable expenses rests on the tax administration. 
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If the false or incorrect information might resolute in a tax penalty or other criminal 
consequences, it is a general principal that the burden of proof rests on the prosecutor. 
3. Burden of proof regarding discretionary decisions on tax issues or regarding 
estimated assessments  
In Sweden, tax assessments may be made by discretionary decisions or by estimates, in 
situations where the taxpayer has failed to fulfil his bookkeeping obligations. In such cases 
the tax administration has to show that its estimate was “probable”. If the estimated 
assessment is probable, then the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer and he has to provide 
evidence that the estimate is incorrect.  
 
Question: How is the burden of proof allocated in discretionary decisions on tax assessments 
or for estimates in your country? Is the burden of proof different if a tax penalty within such a 
tax assessment is being imposed? 
 
JB 
If the taxpayer has failed to file his or her tax return, the tax administration will make a tax 
assessment by a discretionary decision or by estimates, cf. the Danish Tax Control Act, sec. 5. 
In this case, the burden of proof to document the probability of the estimate rests on the tax 
administration. If the tax administration has documented the tax assessment is factual and 
reasonable the burden of proof shifts and the taxpayer has to prove that the estimate is 
incorrect. Normally the burden of proof is stronger when there is a tax penalty, but if the 
taxpayer hasn’t made a tax return, the burden can’t be that strong because the tax 
administration has to make some estimate  
4. Variations in burden of proof with respect to tax havens, etc. 
As follows from the general rule in Sweden, each party must prove whatever is easiest for that 
party. In practice, when it is difficult for the tax administration to obtain the relevant 
information, for example with respect to tax havens, etc., the burden of proof is shifted to the 
taxpayer. In such cases, the burden of proof lies on the taxpayer for both income and costs. 
 
Question: How is the burden of proof allocated where a tax case contains information that is 
difficult or impossible for the tax administration to investigate (e.g. where a tax haven is 
involved)? 
 
JGN 
In Denmark, it is also a basic principle in connection with the allocation of burden of proof 
that it is for the party who has the easiest access to information about a particular fact to prove 
the fact. Consequently, if the courts or tribunals assess that it is difficult or impossible for the 
tax administration to prove certain tax-related facts in connection with e.g. tax havens the 
burden of proof can be allocated to the taxpayer who has easier access to the information. As 
the inquisitorial procedure principle requires the tax administration to procure information and 
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evidence relevant to the case, there will always rest a certain obligation on the tax 
administration to do its best in this respect. At first hand the tax administration must for 
instance render probable the existence of a tax relevant disposition by the taxpayer to, from or 
between companies situated in tax havens after which it befalls the taxpayer to prove the tax 
administration wrong. This can be elaborated by stating, that the more difficult it is for the tax 
administration to substantiate its claim while the taxpayer has access to the relevant 
documentation, the easier the burden of proof shifts to the tax payer.  
 
Moreover, it is quite common that tax related dispositions between a taxpayer or e.g. 
companies controlled by the taxpayer on the one hand and tax entities resident in tax havens 
on the other can be characterized as dispositions between associated parties. If this is the case, 
there is a presumption that the taxpayer has to prove the true commercial nature of the 
dispositions or that the dispositions have taken place at all. 
 
SKM 2005.252 Ø illustrates the burden of proof in a case involving associated parties 
and companies in tax havens. In this case, company A had paid 1, 5 million DKKR to 
other companies as administration remuneration. The Danish High Court established 
that as a main rule the burden of proof concerning the deductibility of the 
administration remuneration rested on company A. Moreover, the burden of proof 
intensified, because the administration remuneration was transferred between 
associated parties. With reference to the production of evidence, the Danish High 
Court established, that the administration remuneration was only paid for the benefit 
of the majority shareholder who owned company A and not to the benefit of company 
A’s operational interests. As a consequence, company A could not deduct the 
administration remuneration pursuant to the Danish State Tax Act, sec. 6. 
  
It is important to note, that the mere involvement of a tax entity residing in a tax haven does 
not in it self imply that the burden of proof shifts from the tax administration to the taxpayer. 
Circumstances in these cases – such as associated companies and controlling shareholders and 
strong intentions of tax reduction – often lead to the burden of proof resting with the taxpayer.  
 
In recent times, Denmark has come to agreement concerning exchange of information on tax 
matters with a number of states en regions some of which have been considered tax havens.11 
These information agreements improves the tax administrations possibility of procuring 
information of relevance to tax cases involving cross border activity to tax havens which may 
influence the burden of proof in cases including the states in mention. 
 
5. Level of the burden of proof 
In Sweden, as mentioned above, the general rule within the ordinary time period for taxation  
is that the tax administration bears the burden of proof for income and the taxpayer for costs. 
                                                 
11
 E.g. Agreement of 12 January 2010 between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the 
Government of the Republic of San Marino on Tax Matters. 
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The general rule regarding evidentiary requirements is that each party has to demonstrate that 
the income/cost is “probable”/”plausible”.  
 
Question: Does your country have a general rule regarding evidentiary requirements? If so, 
what are the requirements (level of proof)? Is it based on the law or on practice? Do different 
rules apply to the tax administration, the tax courts and the criminal courts? And are there 
situations in which the burden of proof is aggravated, for instance when the taxpayer has not 
fulfilled his bookkeeping obligations? 
 
JGN 
According to Danish legal theory the question concerning level of burden of proof in general 
and in tax law cases specifically cannot be answered unambiguously and no general rule on 
onus of proof exists in Denmark. The general view of the level of burden of proof is, that 
numerous and different factors may have an effect on the severity of the burden of proof in 
any given tax dispute depending on the concrete case. If the parties of a tax case agree with 
each other about a tax related fact in a case, the courts do not need any further evidence 
concerning this fact due to the negotiation principle.12 It is when a party contests a fact that 
supports the opposite party’s a claim that the question about level of onus of proof arises, and 
in these instances tribunals or courts are obliged to choose a perception of the disputed fact on 
which to base the decision. Observed and verifiable facts and uncontested facts can normally 
be applied as is. When it comes to a fact in dispute e.g. the followings factors may play a role 
based on case law: 
− An intuitive assessment of the level of probability in favour of or against a given 
perception of a disputed fact 
− General experience in connection with the given forms of facts or dispositions 
− The level of conviction which the evidence concerning a disputed fact supports 
− The reliability of parties and/or witnesses 
− The general pattern of reaction or mercantile customs related to a disputed fact or 
disposition (how would a persons generally react or understand a given situation)   
Technical evidence or verifiable documents provide a high level of probability and generally 
weighs heavily in favour of a party whose claim is supported by this form of evidence. The 
importance of a piece of evidence consists of the probability of accuracy related to a piece of 
information which is the product of evidence procurement.13 Consequently, it is not possible 
to indicate in general the required or necessary level of onus of proof in Danish civil cases 
according to Danish legal discourse. 
 
I criminal cases conviction requires proof that leaves no reasonable doubt about a charged 
person’s guilt. In comparison, the mere higher level of probability of a piece of evidence 
concerning a disputed fact may in some civil cases suffice for the court or tribunal to consider 
                                                 
12
 Cf. Bernhard Gomard & Michael Kistrup: Civilprocessen, 6. ed., (2007), p. 558 and 560. Naturally, this does 
not apply to criminal cases. 
13
 Cf. Bernhard Gomard & Michael Kistrup: Civilprocessen, 6. ed., (2007), p. 567. 
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the fact proven. I general, however, it is assumed that a reasonable high degree of probability 
is required to support a clam in a legal court proceeding or a complaint case at a tribunal. 
 
When the allocation of burden of proof is expressly stipulated in a tax law provision, the 
consequence is often stricter requirements to the level of probability supported by the relevant 
piece of evidence. Furthermore, the considerations that lie behind the provision are taken in 
account as described in the provision’s preparatory work.   
 
In Denmark, a party’s possibility of ensuring evidence also influences the assessment of such 
evidence which is furthermore emphasized if the party would normally or customary be 
expected to ensure evidence in a given situation. 
 
These numerous and sometimes vague factors all have to be taken into consideration by the 
courts or tribunals when deciding the level of evidence required to support a claim, allegation 
or submission. As mentioned above regarding the income-side, the initial burden of proof 
concerning income rests on the tax administration that is charged with proving the existence 
of an income and that the income in mention can be attributed to a taxpayer, cf. the Danish 
State Tax Act, sec. 4, which also complies with starting point in Danish legal discourse 
according to which the party who claims that a legal obligation exists has to prove this.14 As a 
main rule, the tax administration has to prove the income side to a relatively high level of 
probability including actual documentation that can be verified. In cases concerning income 
fixation the evidence is of a more circumstantial nature why the tax administration is allowed 
to procure evidence by indirect means e.g. by proving that a company has benefitted from a to 
low interest rate or below market rent payments and that the value of this benefit has to be 
taxed. The abovementioned access for the tax administration to estimate a taxpayer’s tax 
assessment in lack of an income tax return, cf. the Danish Tax Control Act, sec. 5 (3), does in 
practice require that the estimate is substantiated on facts to as great an extent as possible. For 
instance, the number of pizza boxes that a pizzeria has bought and which are no longer in 
stock at the pizzeria may indirectly be used as evidence for the tax administration’s income 
estimate concerning the pizzeria’s turnover.  
 
When it comes to expenses, the burden of proof normally rests with the taxpayer, who claims 
to have the right to deduct the expense, but the level of proof concerning expenses varies. 
There is e.g. a presumption that the employer covers necessary costs in connection with an 
employee’s work why the burden of proof for an employed salary earner concerning costs in 
connection with his or her position is intensified. On the other hand, a business owner is 
expected to pay expenses related to his or her business why the burden of proof concerning 
these expenses is less intense the rationale being that a business owner also has to accept the 
risk of losses pertaining to the business operation. 
 
                                                 
14
 Bernhard Gomard & Michael Kistrup: Civilprocessen, 6. ed., (2007), p. 577. 
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In legal court proceeding and compliant cases, a taxpayer not procuring documentation which 
he or she could have supplied the court of tribunal with can be deemed to be in favour of the 
opposite party, cf. AJA, sec. 344 (3).15 
6. Evidentiary requirements in discretionary/estimated tax assessments 
See question no. 4 above on the burden of proof in discretionary/estimated tax assessments. 
The tax administration has to show that its estimate is “probable”. If the discretionary tax 
assessment is combined with a tax penalty, which is often the case, the tax administration also 
has to show that the tax penalty is “probable”. The tax penalty in such cases so to speak 
follows automatically upon the discretionary tax assessment. 
 
If the tax assessment is made according to the rules on additional taxation (two years after the 
tax year) the tax administration has to “prove” that the information is false/incorrect.  
 
Question: What are the evidentiary requirements (level of proof) for discretionary/estimated 
tax assessments? Are the evidentiary requirements the same for tax penalties in such cases? 
Are the evidentiary requirements different if the tax assessments are being made according to 
the rules for additional tax assessments (i.e. do such rules exist in your country)? 
 
JB 
As mentioned above do the tax administration has to show that its estimate is probable. The 
tax penalty follows automatically upon the discretionary tax assessment. 
7. Evidentiary requirements depending on exchange of information, tax havens, etc. 
From question no. 4 above it follows that if it is difficult or impossible for the tax 
administration to investigate situations having to do with tax havens, the burden of proof may 
shift. More and more countries have entered into information exchange agreements with tax 
havens which could affect the burden and level of proof. 
 
Question: Are the evidentiary requirements affected by the possibility for the tax 
administration to investigate circumstances in a case e.g. by means of exchange of 
information with a country involved? 
 
JGN 
In recent years, the international effort to counteract harmful tax practice e.g. by means of 
improving information exchange has also had an effect on Denmark’s international relations. 
On basis of the principles in the OECD standard agreement on information exchange from 
2002 as revised in 2005, Denmark has signed information exchange agreements with a 
number of non-member states including Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Aruba and The Netherlands Antilles. Furthermore, 
                                                 
15
 The principle in this provision also applies in complaints cases, but the tax administration is always obliged to 
do its best to procure necessary information due to the inquisitorial procedure principle.  
 11 
agreements with Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Switzerland and Singapore have been 
amended to ensure that information exchange includes bank information.  
 
As mentioned above the agreements on exchange of information have an induced effect on 
burden of proof in tax cases in which such agreements are relevant the reason being that the 
Danish tax administration is obliged to procure any information relevant to the case according 
to the principle of inquisitorial procedure. This is the case in both legal court proceedings and 
in administrative complaints cases. If the agreement does not supply the tax administration 
with effective means of procuring information and the taxpayer furthermore is found to have 
easier access the relevant documentation of other evidence the burden of proof often shifts to 
the taxpayer. This tendency to place the burden of proof with the taxpayer in cases including 
tax havens is increased if dispositions between associated tax entities are involved. 
 
8. Different evidentiary requirements for different types of taxes 
In Sweden, in certain cases, the evidentiary requirements seem to differ for different types of 
taxes in the same case. For example, for false invoices of subcontractors, different types of 
taxes are involved: income tax, VAT and social security fees. In Sweden, it seems as though 
different evidentiary requirements are applicable for these different types of taxes. 
 
Question: Are different evidentiary requirements applicable in your country for different types 
of taxes? 
 
JB 
There might be a difference between the evidentiary requirements to different types of taxes 
in Denmark. It is only natural that there are such differences, because some of the taxes are 
based on EU regulations while some of the taxes are related only by the Danish Government.  
 
VAT and some other type of duties are regulated by EU law and these regulations determine 
how the burden of proof has to be carrying out. This should be consistent in all EC and the tax 
administration or the court has to follow these rules of proof. Apparently there is some 
problem with some of the custom law, where the national regulation is requiring stronger 
evidence than according to the EC regulation. 
9. General rule on evaluation of evidence and the limitations to such a rule 
In Sweden there exists the principle of a free assessment of evidence. A consequence of this is 
that the evidence in a case is also freely evaluated by the tax administration and ultimately by 
the tax court. The principle of the free assessment and evaluation of evidence in tax matters is 
statutory.  
 
Question: Is the evaluation of evidence free or is it in any way limited? Is it statutory or is it 
based on practice?  
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JB 
In Denmark there exists the principle of a free assessment of evidence, but at the same time 
the tax administration has an obligation to try to make the right tax assessment. This 
obligation means that if it is possible to obtain information to make the right decision the tax 
administration has to provide some effort to get this. Of course the tax administration hasn’t 
got unlimited resources to pursue the information and will often rely on information given by 
the taxpayer, but if the administration somehow gets other information from elsewhere it is 
obliged to use it. 
  
If and when the tax case is brought to court it is not the court obligation to make a correct tax 
assessment. The court has to make a decision on how a rule has to be interpreted and whether 
or not there are proofs of the income or expenses. This means that the litigants in the case has 
to provide the evidence for the court and the court will rule on this evidence and not collect 
further evidence. 
 
Part B: Burden of Proof in Anti-Abuse Provisions 
10. General anti-abuse provision 
Question: Is there a general anti-abuse provision in your (procedural) tax law and which party 
bears the burden of proof under this provision? 
Please illustrate the actual way this provision is given form: what does it provide for and to 
what extent is the term “anti-abuse” specified? In case there is no such provision in your 
national tax law, is reference made to anti-abuse provisions in other fields of law? An 
example of an anti-abuse provision or principle that originates from civil law is the principle 
of good faith (principle of abuse of law). Please explain as well the actual way the burden of 
proof is given form. Some jurisdictions have established a two-step mechanism, e.g. Germany 
in Sec. 42 General Tax Code: It is up to the tax authority to provide probable cause - it has to 
be substantiated that the taxpayer’s legal arrangement is inappropriate. The taxpayer has then 
subsequently to give proof to the contrary, i.e. to substantiate that the rationale for his 
arrangement is not tax related but e.g. based on economic reasons. 
JB 
In Denmark there is no general anti-abuse provision. Many abuse situations can be dealt with 
according to the general tax rule in the Danish State Tax Act sec. 4. Gifts and other 
economical benefits are taxable under the same provisions as other kinds of income. The gifts 
etc. can both be a formally gift, but can also be considered as such if a transfer of an asset 
hasn’t been paid in full. If there is a transfer of assets between parties with joint interests, and 
the prices doesn’t match market prizes, the parties have to proof that the deviation from the 
market prizes is based on business considerations. There is often no room for business talent 
in these transfers. 
For some groups of parties with joint interest there is a general rule in the Danish Tax 
Assessment Act sec.2. According to this rule these parties can only make transactions at arm’s 
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length. If the arrangement is not at arm’s length there will be taxation according to the arms 
length of the arrangement. Those who are subject of the taxation in the Danish Tax 
Assessment Act sec. 2 are related companies and companies with their principal shareholders. 
The tax authority has to prove that the prizes and terms differ from market prize, but then the 
taxpayer has the burden of proof as to whether this difference has a special reason for 
business purposes. 
11. Alternative or supplementary approaches 
Question: Are there any other (alternative or supplementary) approaches established in 
practice or by case-law in this regard and do these comply with the general principle of the 
division of burden of proof in your country? 
Examples of such other ways may be the economic approach, the look-through approach or 
substance over form approach, all of which deal with the relation between legal form and 
economic substance. E.g. in Sweden, an anti-abuse provision is part of Swedish tax law, but a 
look-through approach established in practice is applied in this regard as well. If your 
jurisdiction recognizes both anti-abuse provisions and other approaches, is there a priority in 
application? With regard to the division of burden of proof, are there any deviations from the 
general principle recognized in many jurisdictions that each party has to prove the facts that 
are advantageous for them? 
JB 
The Danish courts in general use a realistic way of interpretation. This means that the court 
when it interprets a rule it consider what really had happened. The courts rules on the 
substance and not on the form the arrangement has taken. 
There is great discussion as to what extent this substance over form can go. Professor Jan 
Pedersen has in his doctorial thesis stated that in Denmark, there is a Principle of Reality 
“realitetsgrundsætning”, which the courts use when ruling in a tax case. According to this 
principle the arrangement will be set aside if consists of empty and artificial transaction for 
tax purposes. The taxation will then be in accordance with the true economic substance. This 
principle is an unwritten anti-abuse rule. The tax authority has to prove that an atypical 
transaction has taken place instead of a more usual transaction, and give probable reason that 
this abnormal transaction has taken place to save the taxpayer for tax. Then the taxpayer has 
to prove that there is a good economical reason for the atypical transaction. There is dispute to 
whether or not this principle is being used by the courts, and after the latest Supreme Court 
decision  in TfS 2006, 1062 HD, it is clear that the principle, at least doesn’t apply in cases 
where the arrangements is according to written civil law.  
Besides this Principle of Reality there is another principle relevant for tax issues. This 
principle is also highly controversial. It is the Theory of the Tree and the Fruits, which in 
Denmark have been launched by Professor Aage Michelsen. According to this theory the 
person to be taxed of an income, should be the person who has the right to the income, and if 
a person who has the right to the income gives this income to another person, the given person 
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will not be relieved of the taxation. A consequence of this rule is that a person should be taxed 
of a fixed income, when the person has renounced the income for the beneficial of another. In 
this case the tax authority has to prove that a person has the right to an income and give some 
indications that the reason for the renunciation is the joint interest. The taxpayer then has to 
prove that there is a good economical reason for the arrangement. The Theory of the Tree and 
the Fruits has been rejected by the Supreme Court in a case about taxation of a fixated 
interest, but has been accepted by the Supreme Court in cases concerning taxation of fixated 
rent. 
12. Special anti-abuse provisions 
Question: Are there special anti-abuse provisions dealing with the burden of proof in 
particular tax law areas and what exact requirements does the taxpayer have to fulfill? Is the 
required level of proof higher compared to the general provision or principle? 
Typically, special anti-abuse provisions can be found in the context of cross-border 
situations/international transactions. If such provisions exist in your jurisdiction, have there 
been any reasons given by the legislator for dealing differently with these situations, e.g. that 
the ex officio discovery of the facts is particularly difficult for the tax authorities and so the 
burden may be shifted due to the fact that the disclosure of facts is more within the sphere of 
the taxpayer than within the sphere of the tax authority? Please elaborate on whether there are, 
according to that reasoning, some provisions in which a situation is deemed to be abusive 
unless proven otherwise by the taxpayer. 
Usually, special anti-abuse provisions also set special requirements which may include the 
disclosure of certain documents, proof of the appropriateness of certain legal arrangements, 
the compatibility of intra-group transfer prices with the arm’s length principle, etc. Are there 
any provisions that set the requirements or the level of proof so high that producing proof to 
the contrary is virtually impossible? 
JB 
Pursuant to the Danish Tax Control Act sec. 3 there is an obligation for related parties to give 
information and keep documentations for transactions between controlled parties. This rule 
should originally only apply to cross-border ownerships, but it was questioned whether there 
could be an EC conflict, and the rule therefore in 2005 was extended to apply also to pure 
national ownerships. 
Because of the burden of this documentations claim this rule only applies for controlled 
companies who employ more than 250 people and has a total balance on more than 125 
million DKKR or an annual turnover of more than 250 million DKKR. If these terms are not 
met, the documentations claims apply only if the companies are resident in a foreign country, 
which has no double taxation convention with Denmark and at the same time is not a member 
of the EU or EØS. 
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This documentation rule is closely linked to the rule in the Danish Tax Assessment Act sec. 2, 
where the same group of related persons has to be at arm’s length in all arrangement between 
them, and according to this rule in sec. 3 B of the Danish Tax Control Act they also has the 
burden of the documentation for the arm’s length. The taxpayers has the burden of proof and 
documentation for the transactions between the related parties, but it is the tax authorities who 
has the burden of proof of whether or not these transactions are within arm’s length or not. 
13. Competent authority 
Question: Which body (tax authority, independent institution or tax court) may decide if the 
required level of proof is met? Are there different levels of proof that e.g. the tax authority or 
the taxpayer have to fulfill? 
In some jurisdictions, the decision whether the required level of proof is met will be - at first 
instance - up to the tax authority. In France, however, an independent institution (consultative 
committee, comité consultative pour le repression des abus de droit) decides whether certain 
arrangements have to be considered abusive. In other jurisdictions, for instance in Sweden, it 
is only up to the court to decide whether the required level of proof is met. With regard to the 
level of proof imposed on the tax authority, there might be deviations from the requirements 
set on taxpayers. Different levels of the burden of proof may be imposed, for instance, on the 
parties by means of the economic substance test (proof that a legal arrangement was made not 
only for tax-related reasons): while the tax authorities may only be required to show probable 
cause, the taxpayer may be required to prove both economic profit potential and a subjective 
business purpose. 
JB 
In Denmark it is the normal court that has to decide whether or not the required level of proof 
is met, and it is difficult to say whether there is a different level for the required proof for the 
taxpayer or the tax authority. There is neither no evidence that the court changes the level of 
proof as to whether the tax payer are using the rule contrary to the intension of the law.  
In one situation the court refrain from changing the tax authority’s decision. This is the case, 
if the decision involves an estimate over a value. If the tax authorities have to make an 
estimate of a value in according med the law, the court will be reluctant to change the tax 
authority’s decision. 
14. Judicial review 
Question: Is the decision of the above authority or body subject to a full (or a partial) judicial 
review and are there different levels of burden of proof in the different stages of the judicial 
proceedings? 
Please explain the extent to which the decision of the body that is in charge of deciding 
whether the required level of proof has been met is binding. In case the decision is subject to a 
judicial review, is the court bound to a certain extent by the prior decision (e.g. that the 
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decision will only undergo a plausibility check)? With regard to the different stages of judicial 
proceedings, it should be elaborated on, for instance, whether the tax authority may impose a 
different level of burden of proof on the taxpayer than a tax court does. May the taxpayer be 
obliged to present clear and convincing evidence in tax authority proceedings, while a 
preponderance of the evidence is a sufficient standard before tax courts? 
JB 
In theory there should be a difference in the level of proof as to whether the decision is made 
by the tax authorities or by the courts. When a decision has to be made by public authorities 
they normally has to comply with the “officialmaximen” which is mentioned above and 
translated as the principle of inquisitorial procedure. This “officialmaximen” in taxation 
means that the tax authorities’ main goal is to make a correct decision and therefore they are 
also obliged to make some effort to get the right information to make the correct decision. 
When and if the case comes to court the case is no longer under the “officialmaximen” but is 
now treated in accordance with the “forhandlingsmaximen”. The “forhandlingsmaximen” 
means that the parties at court decide what question the court has to decide on, what evidence 
the court has to take into consideration etc. If the parties haven’t produced evidence, the court 
has to make at decision without this evidence 
The use of the “officialmaximen” and the “forhandlingsmaximen” could make a difference in 
the outcome of a case. An issue has to be dealt with in the administrative system before it can 
go to court. Then there could be a difference of the level of proof between the administrative 
system and the court system.  
This is the theoretical approach. In practical there will seldom be a difference. The tax 
authorities haven’t got the time and means to make sure all aspects are being presented. Some 
of the aspects it is naturally the taxpayer presents. One of the places where the difference 
comes forth is that the administrative courts can make a decision that is neither in accordance 
with the taxpayers claim nor with the tax-authorities. This is not possible for the court. 
15. Case law 
Question: Are there any court judgments in your jurisdiction concerning the burden of proof 
with regard to: 
a) the situations in which (special) anti-abuse provisions may be applied to the taxpayer? 
b) the requirements that may be imposed on the taxpayer? 
c) the compatibility of burden-of-proof provisions in anti-abuse matters with your country’s 
Constitution or EU law? 
In the answer to these questions, the focus should be in particular on the limits set by the 
courts, e.g. that the application of certain provisions is within the discretion of the tax 
authority, but that tax officers, however, have to comply with the principles of proportionality 
 17 
and reasonableness. A special point at issue may be the challenge of anti-abuse provisions 
(especially for general anti-abuse rules) on grounds of not complying with the principle of 
legal certainty or, on the other hand, the justification as the fulfilment of the constitutional 
duty to safeguard the principle of equality of tax burdens. 
JB 
As mentioned above there has been cases concerning Principle of Reality and the Theory of 
the tree and the fruits and taxation of fixated income. Sec. 3 B in was changed because we 
were afraid that it was in conflict with the EC, if it only should apply on foreign transactions.  
In C-55/98 (Vestergaard) the EC-court found that the Danish practice on deduction of 
expenses for course participation was in conflict with art. 59 (now art. 56). According to the 
Danish practice there was a presumption that the expense was a private expense, if the course 
was held in a foreign country on a typical tourist place. In these cases the burden of proof was 
turned over to the taxpayer. The same presumption wasn’t practiced with tourist places in 
Denmark where it was the tax authorities that has the burden of proof. After the EC-decision 
the tax authorities send an announcement stated that the differentiation between Denmark and 
other countries couldn’t be upheld and in the future there should be an evaluation on each 
case, and the main interest would be on how the time and activities on the courses. 
 
Part C: The burden of proof and European tax law 
16. EC law and the reversal of the burden of proof  
In the famous Leur-Bloem case (ECJ 17 July 1997, case C-28/95) the ECJ ruled as follows: 
“Article 11 of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that in determining whether the 
planned operation has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion 
or tax avoidance, the competent national authorities must carry out a general examination of 
the operation in each particular case. Such an examination must be open to judicial review. 
Under Article 11(1)(a) of the Directive, the Member States may stipulate that the fact that the 
planned operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons constitutes a presumption of 
tax evasion or tax avoidance. It is for the Member States, observing the principle of 
proportionality, to determine the internal procedures necessary for this purpose. However, the 
laying down of a general rule automatically excluding certain categories of operations from 
the tax advantage, on the basis of criteria such as those mentioned in the second answer under 
(a), whether or not there is actually tax evasion or tax avoidance, would go further than is 
necessary for preventing such tax evasion or such tax avoidance and would undermine the 
aim pursued by the Directive.” 
 
In general the outcome of this ruling can be described as follows: 
1. Member States are not allowed to have provisions in their national tax laws that deem 
certain situations to have occurred primarily as the result of tax evasion or tax 
avoidance, while at the same time allowing the taxpayer to provide proof to the 
contrary. This reversal of the burden of proof to the detriment of the taxpayer violates 
EC law. 
2. The tax administration must prove that the motive of a transaction is tax avoidance or 
tax evasion on a case-by-case basis. 
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Questions 
1. Could you give an impression how the Leur-Bloem judgment was viewed in your 
country by lawyers, the judiciary and the government? 
 
The Leur-Bloem case is acknowledged as e very central ECJ judgement in Danish legal 
discourse and this is accentuated by the judgement very often being cited in Danish complaint 
cases and legal proceedings.  
 
JGN 
According to Danish tax law reorganization of companies with deferred taxation covered by 
the Merger Directive has since 200716 been possible without specific approval by the tax 
administration if certain conditions are met. The reason for the relatively new Danish 
possibility for reorganization of companies with deferred taxation without approval is derived 
from the Merger Directive (MTA) art. 11 (1) (a). However, it is still a characteristic of the 
Danish tax treatment of divisions, transfer of assets and exchange of shares, that the approval 
requirement does in fact constitute the original and present Danish implementation of the 
Merger Directive art. 11. This has led to discussion in Danish legal discourse since it is a 
consequence of the Danish tax treatment that some divisions, transfer of assets and exchange 
of shares are allowed without approval from the tax administration while others require prior 
approval to ensure deferred taxation.17 The central issue of the criticism concerning the 
Danish requirement of approval and the stipulated conditions which have to be met to achieve 
reorganization without approval is primarily based on two elements: Firstly, does the Merger 
Directive in fact allow a member state to set up a requirement a prior approval to obtain the 
rights stipulated in directive? Secondly, it was in connection with tax treatment of divisions, 
transfer of assets and exchange of shares a condition for division of companies with deferred 
taxation pursuant to the Danish MTA sec. 15 a (1)18 that the involved companies do not sell 
shares of the concerned companies within 3 years of the division. The compliance of this 
requirement with the Merger Directive is considered questionable.19  
 
The Leur-Bloem case led to amendment of the Danish Merger Taxation Act by statute no 166 
of 24 March 1999. This amendment ensured that decisions of the Danish tax administration 
concerning reorganization taxation covered by the Merger Directive can be appealed to the 
Danish National Tax Tribunal.20  
 
The outcome of the ECJ ruling in the Leur-Bloem case plays an important role in Denmark 
when it is necessary to determine the limits set by the anti-avoidance provision in the Merger 
Directive art. 11. Assessing whether the tax avoidance or tax evasion is the main purpose or 
on of the main purposes of the reorganization has to be done individually in each case. It is 
assumed that the reorganization of companies may have tax deferral as an effect but not as a 
main purpose.21 If reorganization of companies is not based on sound and businesslike 
                                                 
16
 Cf. Act No 343 of 18 April 2007 (Bill 110 A) 
17
 Cf. Jan Pedersen, Kurt Siggaard, Niels Winther-Sørensen, Jakob Bundgaard, Inge Langhave Jeppesen, 
Malene Kerzel og Susanne Pedersen: Skatteretten 2, (2009), 5. ed., p. 533, Erik Werlauff: RR 1993, Issue 8, p. 
44 ff., Michael Serup: RR 1994, Issue 4, p. 30 f. and Hanne Østergaard: TfS 1993, 536.   
18
 Consolidated Act No 1286 of 8 November 2007 as ammended. 
19
 By Statute No 512 of 12 June 2009. 
20
 Judicial review applies to decisions of the Danish National Tax Tribunal. 
21
 Cf. Jan Pedersen, Kurt Siggaard, Niels Winther-Sørensen, Jakob Bundgaard, Inge Langhave Jeppesen, 
Malene Kerzel og Susanne Pedersen: Skatteretten 2, (2009), 5. ed., p. 535 and Michael Serup: 
Fusionsskatteloven med kommentarer, (2008), 3. ed., p. 59 ff. 
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commercial considerations this may create a presumption for tax evasion or tax avoidance 
thus leading to a denial of approval by the tax administration. If the applicant cannot convince 
the tax administration of the sound commercial nature of reorganizing, the applicant has to 
file a complaint to the National Danish Tax Administration. In effect this means that the tax 
administration can set up a rebuttable presumption and if the taxpayer cannot refute this 
presumption of tax evasion or tax avoidance according to the tax administration, the taxpayer 
has to use his or her right of appeal. The presumption can be refuted by the taxpayer by e.g. 
documenting the purpose of the reorganization being: 
 
− A realization of succession plans 
− The wish to strengthen the foundation of business 
− The intention of starting up new business activities 
− To reorganize companies based on commercial considerations 
− Rationalization 
− To establish a merger-like cooperation between independent companies 
− Matrimonial property considerations 
− The existence of operational or cash flow related reasons, risk limitation or handling 
of cooperation related problems. 
 
As a main rule – from a Danish point of view – reorganization of companies with tax deferral 
becomes problematic in view of the tax evasion or tax avoidance provision, if the 
restructuring is followed by sale or transfer of shares which is not taxed in accordance with 
normal share taxation principles or in case of infringement with other tax provisions.22 
Consequently, it is assumed that the complete operation in mention has to be primarily 
motivated by tax-related considerations in order for the tax administration to turn down an 
application for approval. Moreover, this leads to the conclusion that tax evasion or tax 
avoidance has to be the primary objective behind the reorganization for the tax avoidance 
provision in the Merger Directive to be relevant. In relation to the question of burden of proof 
in these cases it is assumed, that an ordinary assessment of evidence related to the operation is 
required to establish whether tax evasion is the main purpose.23 The evidentiary procedure has 
to be based on recognition of the fact that the disposition may very well be soundly and 
commercially well-founded even though taxation would prevent the reorganization without 
approval for tax deferral according to the Merger Directive as implemented by the Danish 
Merger Taxation Act.24 An account of the extensive and complex development concerning the 
interpretation and implementation of the Merger Directive art. 11 shall not be given here, but 
the present state of law in Denmark related to this question is still not quite clear. 
 
In brief, case studies now show that the tax administration’s interpretation of the Merger 
Directive is currently based on the following: 
 
− It is not up to the taxpayer to prove that tax avoidance or tax evasion is not the primary 
purpose behind the reorganization. 
− It is not necessarily up to the taxpayer to meet burdensome requirements of concrete 
documentation. 
                                                 
22
 Cf. Michael Serup: Fusionsskatteloven med kommentarer (2008), 3. ed., p. 89 and 135 ff. 
23
 Ibidem, p. 90. 
24
 The Danish Tax Ministry seems to acknowledge this interpretation of the Merger Directive art. 11 in a 
commentary to a court settlement at one of the two Danish High Courts (Vestre Landsret), cf. SKM 2007.807. 
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− The application does not necessarily need to document an actual need for 
reorganization. 
 
In summary, the taxpayer has to present the relevant considerations in connection with the 
operation to the tax administration while the administration – in accordance with the 
inquisitorial procedure principle – may ask questions to the taxpayer who is required to 
answer these questions loyally. The consequence is that a presupposition of tax avoidance eo 
ipso requires a sure evidentiary foundation, and that the taxpayer and the tax administration in 
effect share the burden of proof – each pulling on different ends of the rope so to speak – to 
establish whether tax avoidance or tax evasion is the primary purpose of a given 
reorganization. 
 
It is not quite sure according to Danish case practice whether the tax administration’s 
requirement for concrete documentation of commercial and businesslike purpose of 
reorganization of companies is so strict that concrete and actual plans of action have to be 
presented or if a concrete presentation of business considerations suffices.25 
 
2. Did the decision lead to any significant changes in legislation? 
 
JGN 
This has already been mentioned above. 
 
3. Are there provisions in the national tax legislation that do not yet meet the 
standards in the Leur-Bloem judgment? 
 
JGN 
Some elements of the Danish tax legislation and practice concerning reorganization and the 
case law related to this legislation is disputed. The core elements of this discussion are 
mentioned above. In connection with exchange of shares before the Leur-Bloem decision, the 
Danish tax administration imposed a condition on taxpayers according to which shares could 
not be sold or transferred within a three year period after the exchange in order to obtain tax 
deferral (the holding-requirement). This practice was considered an infringement with the 
Leur-Bloem decision which stipulated that the overall circumstances in connection with the 
operation has to the subject of a concrete assessment in order to establish whether tax 
avoidance or tax evasion is the primary or one of the primary purposes of the operation.26 
Consequently, the standard condition was replaced by an obligation for the taxpayer to notify 
the tax administration about essential changes within three years after the exchange of shares 
concerning conditions of the approval of exchange of shares with tax deferral. The effect of 
this obligation to notify the tax administration is that ownership of shares or share related 
voting rights are not allowed to change for three years after the exchange of shares. 
Dispensations are extremely rare. Moreover, subsequent sale of exchanged shares without 
capital gains taxation within the three year period is not allowed.  
 
The existence of this practice of mandatory notice could lead to the conclusion that a concrete 
assessment of the complete circumstances related to exchange of shares to uncover the 
importance of tax avoidance or tax evasion purposes does in fact not take place as required 
according to the Leur Bloum-decision.27 
                                                 
25
 Cf. Michael Serup: Fusionsskatteloven med kommentarer (2008), 3. ed., p. 108. 
26
 Ibidem, p. 607. 
27
 Cf. Bent Ramskov: Aktieombytning og uegentlig fusion (2004), p. 183 ff. 
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As mentioned below, the holding requirement is also enforced as regards divisions and 
transfer of assets. 
17. Reversal of the burden of proof and time limits 
Article 14, paragraph 4 of the Netherlands Corporate Income Tax Act 1969 contains a specific 
provision concerning the possible abuse of merger facilities with regard to an asset merger. It 
provides that if the shares in the receiving company that were received on the occasion of the 
transfer of the assets to the receiving company are being sold within three years after the 
merger, the merger facilities are retroactively withdrawn unless the taxpayer proves that the 
transaction was carried out for sound business reasons. 
 
Question: Does the tax legislation of your country contain similar provisions and how do you 
assess such a provision in the light of EU (tax) law? 
 
JGN 
The abovementioned obligation to notify the tax administration about essential changes after 
an exchange of shares with deferred taxation resembles the art. 14, paragraph 4 of the 
Netherlands Corporate Income Tax Act 1969, and the condition is partly set in practice or 
expressly by the Danish MTA. Generally, a holding-requirement is enforced in Danish tax 
treatment of divisions, transfers of assets and exchange of shares illustrated in the following 
way: 
 
Form of reorganization With/without approval Provision Holding-requirement 
With approval MTA sec. 15 a (1) – 
requirement set in 
practice as condition for 
tax deferral 
Shares received as 
remuneration cannot be 
sold or transferred before 
three years after the date 
of division 
Division 
Without approval MTA sec. 15 a (1) – 
condition expressly set in 
provision 
Companies which owns 
more than 10 pct. of the 
shares in the relevant 
companies cannot sell or 
transfer its shares before 
three years after the date 
of division 
With approval MTA sec. 15 c (1) – 
requirement set in 
practice as condition for 
tax deferral 
Transferring company 
must keep shares in 
receiving company for at 
least three years 
Transfer of assets 
Without approval MTA sec 15 c (1) – 
condition set expressly in 
provision 
Transferring company 
cannot sell or transfer 
shares of receiving 
company before three 
years after the transfer of 
assets 
Exchange of shares With approval Danish Share Taxation 
Act sec. 36 (1) – 
requirement set in 
practice as condition for 
tax deferral 
Obligation to notify tax 
administration about 
essential changes for 
three years after the 
exchange. Includes 
notification about 
changes regarding 
ownership/voting right 
related to exchanged 
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shares. Selling the shares 
within three years after 
the exchange will as a 
mail rule lead to taxation 
by cancelling the 
approval 
Without approval Danish Share Taxation 
Act sec. 36 (6) – 
condition set expressly in 
provision 
Receiving company 
cannot sell or transfer 
shares in acquired 
company before three 
years after the exchange 
of shares 
   
There are exceptions from the holding-requirement either stipulated in the relevant provisions 
or implemented in practice. 
 
 
18. Reversal of the burden of proof and transactions with non-domestic entities 
Article 13b, paragraph 4 of the Netherlands Income Tax Act 1969 contains a specific 
provision to combat abuse of tax law where an intra-group loan is written down. It provides 
that if the loan that was written down for Netherlands tax purposes is sold to a company 
established outside the Netherlands or to a natural person resident outside the Netherlands, it 
is deemed to be a transaction with a foreign company belonging to the group or with a natural 
person having a substantial interest in the group, unless the taxpayer proves the contrary. 
The background of this provision is the situation that the written-down loan leaves the 
Netherlands tax jurisdiction even though it is not clear whether or not the loan was sold to an 
affiliated group company or a natural person. If the loan is sold to a third party, the writing 
down of the loan definitely ends up as a final tax loss that stays in the Netherlands. But if the 
loan stays ‘within the group’ the writing down of the loan is recaptured. 
 
Question: Does your national tax legislation contain a more or less similar provision and what 
is your opinion of the provision in the light of EU law requirements? 
 
JGN 
Danish tax law does not operate with a provision similar to the Dutch provision on intra-group 
loans which are written down. However, the Danish Act on Taxation of Profit and Losses on 
Debt (TPLD)28 includes another and general provision based on objective criteria which 
covers some of the same situation as the Dutch provision. Pursuant to sec. 4 (1) of the TPLD a 
creditor’s losses on intra-group debt are not deductible.29 Correspondingly, the debtor’s profit 
on debt to intra-group companies is exempt from taxation, cf. TPLD sec. 8 (1). The debtor’s 
exemption from taxation of profit does not apply in case of reduction of debt to a value lower 
than the value of the debt to the creditor at the time of the reduction. The exemption from 
taxation of the debtor’s profit on intra-group debt also applies to cross border intra-group 
relations on the following conditions: The foreign intra-group creditor company cannot deduct 
losses on the debt to the Danish intra-group debtor company pursuant to TPLD sec. 4 (1) 
                                                 
28
 In Danish: Kursgevinstloven, Consolidated Act no 1002, 26 October 2009 as amended.  
29
 This provision does not apply to losses on debtor’s debt acquired as tax liable remuneration for delivered 
goods and services, if it is established, that the corresponding profit on creditor’s debt is liable to tax, cf. TPLD 
sec. 4 (3). Furthermore, stock regulated bonds, interest claims, and losses in connection with debt and claims 
trade are not covered of the provision. 
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under the assumption that the foreign intra-group creditor company were fully tax liable to 
Denmark, and it is established or proven, that losses of the relevant nature are not deductable. 
 
Furthermore, a person’s losses as a creditor on debt to (former) controlled companies are not 
deductible if the conditions in TPLD sec. 14 (2) are met. 
 
If interest or profit related to debt is not taxable due to a DTC the corresponding tax 
deductibility is generally denied pursuant to TPLD sec. 18. Specific regulation applies to 
composition scheme enforced by a majority of the creditors, cf. TPLD sec. 24. 
 
19. Donations to foreign charitable institutions and the burden of proof  
In the Persche case (ECJ 27 January 2009, case C-318/07) the ECJ ruled as follows: “Article 
56 EC precludes legislation of a Member State by virtue of which, as regards gifts made to 
bodies recognised as having charitable status, the benefit of a deduction for tax purposes is 
allowed only in respect of gifts made to bodies established in that Member State, without any 
possibility for the taxpayer to show that a gift made to a body established in another Member 
State satisfies the requirements imposed by that legislation for the grant of such a benefit.” 
 
The deductibility of donations (in money or in kind) to foreign charitable institutions is a 
highly debated topic in the light of EU developments (Community law). In this respect the 
issue of the burden of proof is very relevant as taxpayers often have limited possibilities to 
prove that the foreign institution is involved in charitable activities while the Member State is 
far better equipped to investigate the contested activities. 
 
Question: How do you view the taxpayer’s obligation to provide the requested proof (as held 
by the ECJ) and when does a reasonable division of the burden proof evolve into a situation in 
which, after the taxpayer provides the initial proof, the burden shifts to the tax administration 
to prove the nature of the activities of the foreign charitable institution? 
 
JGN 
In Denmark, the Stauffer-case (ECJ C-386/04) led to the introduction of Bill 31 B 2007/2008 
which was passed as Statute no 335 of 7 May 2007 concerning EU-related adjustments to the 
Danish tax legislation. One of the elements of the statute was an amendment to the Danish 
Tax Assessment Act sec. 8 A and sec. 12 concerning deductible contributions to bodies with a 
charitable status. Pursuant to the Danish Tax Assessment Act sec. 8 A (1), donations are 
deductible, if it is established, that the donation in mention is given to an organization, 
foundation or institution etc the funds of which are spent on charity in favour of a larger 
number of people.30 Moreover, the deductibility of the donation is conditioned by the 
institution etc notifying the tax administration in accordance with the Danish Tax Control Act 
sec. 8 Æ (3). 
 
Furthermore, the following conditions have to be met according to the Danish Tax 
Assessment Act sec. 8 A to obtain deductibility: 
 
− The institution or religious society etc has to be approved in Denmark or in another 
EU/EEA member state of residence. 
                                                 
30
 The deductible donation is maximized to DKK 14.500 (2010) per income year. 
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− According to the institution’s regulations, the objective of the institution etc has to be 
to support charity, which means that the funds have to be allocated in favour of a 
larger number of persons, 1) who are in financial need or experience financial 
difficulties, 2) or to a purpose which in view of the general public can be characterized 
as charitable and in favour of a larger number of persons, or 3) to a religious 
community, cf. the Danish Tax Assessment Act. Sec. 8 A (2). 
− Moreover, the institution’s regulation must contain a provision, according to which an 
eventual liquidation profit etc has to be allotted to another charitable institution. 
 
Sec. 12 (3) concerns continuous contribution to bodies of charity and contains the same 
conditions as sec. 8 A. It is, however, stipulated in the provision, that the funds of the 
charitable institutions etc may only be allotted to humanitarian purposes, to research, to the 
protection of environment or to a religious society. 
 
In Ministerial Order no 837 of 6 August 2008 these conditions are specified further by setting 
up the following conditions.  
− The charitable institution’s funds have to be allocated to a number of persons, who are 
not geographically or in any other way limited to a catchment population of less than 
40,000. 
− The number of donators in the EU/EEA in average surpasses 100 each year in a three 
year period. 
− The yearly gross income or capital of the charitable institution etc surpasses DKK 
150,000.  
 
Moreover, societies, which constitute independent legal bodies, have to meet the following 
conditions: 
 
− The organization’s board of directors cannot be primarily self supplementary. 
− The number of contingency paying members in the EU/EEA surpasses 300. 
− The organization cannot be member of an already approved main organization unless 
the applying organization is a nation-wide organization. 
 
The ministerial order also outlines the documentation which has to enclosed an application for 
approval according to the Danish Tax Assessment Act sec. 8 A and sec. 12 (3). Besides 
enclosing the regulation and accounts of the organization it has to be rendered probable or 
documented that the number of donators surpasses 100 in a three year period. 
 
Approved charitable organizations are obliged to supply the Danish tax administration with 
information each year pursuant to the ministerial order sec. 8 (2) (3). 
 
It is no simple matter for a charitable institution etc in another EU/EEA member state to meet 
the conditions according to Danish tax legislation. The criteria are, however, primarily 
objective except from the possible probability evaluation concerning the number of donators 
in a three year period.  
 
20. The burden of proof and proportionality 
In the recent SGI-case (ECJ 21 January 2010, case C-311/08) the ECJ ruled on profit 
corrections regarding transactions between related companies in a cross-border situation. The 
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contested transactions implied the provision of a loan without taking any interest into 
consideration and the payment of excessive management remunerations.  
The Court held that it was proportional that the initial burden of proof, to demonstrate, on the 
basis of objective and verifiable elements, that the transaction, or elements of the transaction, 
represent an artificial arrangement lies with the tax administration.  
The taxpayer is then to be given the opportunity, without being subject to undue 
administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that may have 
existed for that transaction. See also, paragraph 82 Thin Cap GLO (C-524/04) and paragraph 
84 CFC and Dividend GLO (C-201/05). In the case at hand the taxpayer had a period of one 
month, which could be extended, within which to establish that no unusual or gratuitous 
advantage is involved. This seems to be reasonable. 
This approach seems to be in line with Commission Paper COM(2007) 785 final concerning 
anti-abuse regulations in the field of direct taxes – application in the EU and with regard to 
third countries, page 5. 
 
Question: 
To what extent is the direct tax legislation and case law in your country in line with the 
above-mentioned standards set by the ECJ? 
 
JB 
Yes, Danish tax law complies with this standard as mentioned above in connection with tax 
abuse bases and the Danish Tax Assessment Act. Sec. 2 concerning transfer pricing. The 
initial burden of proof concerning the existence of an artificial tax arrangement rests with the 
tax administration. If the tax administration renders probable the existence of an artificial tax 
arrangement, the taxpayer may try to establish the businesslike nature of the arrangement. 
 
Part D: Burden of Proof in Cross-Border Situations (International Tax Law) 
 
Transfer Pricing Aspects 
21. The burden of proof between tax authorities and taxpayers  
In some countries, the burden of proof may be reversed if the taxpayer is found not to have 
acted in good faith, for example, by not cooperating or complying with reasonable 
documentation requests or by filing false or misleading returns. In other countries, the burden 
of proof lies only with the taxpayer. 
In Italy tax assessments must be properly motivated and the burden of proof is with the tax 
authorities (Art. 2967 Civil Code, which also regulates the burden of proof in the case of tax 
assessments).  
The application of this principle to transfer pricing means that the burden of proof that the 
intercompany pricing is not at arm’s length lies with the tax administration. However - upon 
the notification of a tax assessment providing evidence that costs have not been incurred by 
the taxpayer - the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer, while the tax administration must 
provide reasons supporting the assessment of an increase in taxable income.  
Local tax offices tend to be very aggressive in challenging the deductibility of costs for 
centralized services charged by non-resident companies to their Italian permanent 
establishment or to their resident associated company. Tax assessments are usually based on 
the view that such expenses are not inherent to the business activity carried on in Italy, which 
implies the lack of any benefit to the taxpayer.  
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Question: Who bears the burden, the tax administration or the taxpayer, of proving that 
transfer pricing operations are at arm’s length? 
 
JB 
It is the taxpayer that has the burden of proof as to the pricing of the operation but it is the tax 
authorities that have the burden of proof as to whether this price is according to arm’s length. 
It is naturally that the taxpayer has to prove the price because the taxpayer has easier access to 
this proof. If the taxpayer doesn’t provide this proof it can damage the taxpayer in the trial.  
 
The burden of proof as to whether the price is according to arm’s length lies with the tax 
authorities which also has to prove that the taxpayer has to be dealt with according to § 2 in 
the Assessment Act. 
 
22. Set of documents 
In recent years, OECD member countries and EU Member States have been adopting transfer 
pricing documentation rules.  
The OECD Guidelines are based on the prudent business management principle, which means 
that the need for information should be balanced against the costs and the burden that the 
taxpayer will bear in preparing or obtaining such documentation. The OECD Guidelines stress 
that the tax authorities should take great care that the imposition of documentation 
requirements will not impose disproportionately high costs and administrative burdens on 
MNEs (multinational enterprises), which will have to obtain documentation from foreign 
associated enterprises. The tax authorities should also refrain from requiring taxpayers to 
engage in an exhaustive search for comparable data from uncontrolled transactions if the 
taxpayer reasonably believes that no comparable data can be found or the efforts to find these 
data would be disproportionately high in relation to the amounts at issue. 
The main goal of the European Union Transfer Pricing Documentation (EU TDP) is to 
maintain a balance between, on the one hand, the right of the tax authorities to obtain the 
necessary information from taxpayers in order to assess whether transfer pricing is at arm’s 
length and, on the other hand, the compliance costs MNEs incur from complying with the 
rules. The key reason for implementing the EU TPD was to significantly reduce the tax 
compliance burden and complications that companies have to face when doing business with 
associated enterprises in other EU Member States.  
Italian tax law does not include any formal provisions regarding transfer pricing 
documentation. There is no rule that requires Italian companies to prepare contemporaneous 
documentation describing and supporting the transfer pricing policies that have been adopted 
by the corporate group and the group’s intercompany transactions. Nevertheless, under Article 
32 of Presidential Decree 600 of 20 September 1973, the Italian tax authorities may require 
taxpayers to produce documents concerning the assessment to which they are subject. This 
means that Italian companies must compile documents such as: 
- the group’s legal structure; 
- a description of any existing transfer pricing guidelines or policies within the group; 
- a benchmarking analysis possibly used by the parties to determine the fair market 
price, rate or consideration; 
- intercompany agreements signed by parties; and 
- all documents proving that any inter-company services have been actually rendered to 
the Italian company and the benefit derived by the Italian company from such 
services. 
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Question: Is there a statutory requirement in the national tax legislation to prepare 
documentation proving the arm’s length value in the determination of transfer pricing? Is the 
breach of the rule accompanied by an administrative or criminal penalty? Are “statutory 
requirements” provided or is the “documentation just recommended to avoid shifting the 
burden of proof concerning a reasonable price to the taxpayer”? 
 
JB 
According to § 3 B in the Danish Tax control Act the taxpayer has produce the 
documentations for the prices and terms in transactions with related companies. If the 
taxpayer does not produce this documentation then the tax assessment will be estimated. This 
means that the burden of proof shift to the taxpayer.   
23. Imposition of penalties and burden of proof 
The EU Code of Conduct recommends that Member States not impose documentation- related 
penalties on taxpayers, at least not when they have complied in good faith with the EU TDP 
or with domestic documentation requirements in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable 
time (Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
Economic and Social Committee”, note 3, at 7). 
Italy: There are no specific transfer pricing penalties.  
 
Question: If there is a statutory requirement to prepare documents, what is the nature 
(administrative or criminal) of the related penalty? 
 
JB 
If the taxpayer fails to send the correct documentation for the related transactions then the tax 
assessment will be estimated. But if the taxpayer falls to give information’s of whether or not 
there have been related transactions this will be considered to be failure in the tax return and 
might result in a tax supplement or penalty. 
24. Type of documents to be provided 
Italy: The taxpayer is obliged to provide documents within its legal sphere, e.g. the original 
documents which, assessed overall, lead to a functional analysis; in contrast, the taxpayer is 
not required to provide the summary of the functional analysis. The taxpayer, when 
specifically requested, has to provide (given it might be unable to produce them later) 
documents of its business, and therefore the auditors could well require the production of the 
documents that establish the capital employed and risks assumed in the intercompany 
transaction. For example, a contract between the assessed enterprise and an associated 
company (or correspondence proving covenants between the companies themselves) has to be 
provided to the tax authorities, without any possibility of being used afterwards; instead, the 
summary functional analysis, which also includes an evaluation of the functions performed by 
the taxpayer, may also be produced by the same taxpayer later. 
 
Question: Is the taxpayer required to provide only “original documents” or must it provide 
even a functional analysis with an evaluation? In particular, are there implicit limitations in 
the request for information by domestic tax authorities to foreign companies within the same 
group of the audited company? (For example: during the tax audit, does the taxpayer have to 
provide the price that its foreign affiliates paid to independent enterprise or should the tax 
administration consult the competent foreign tax authorities by means of information 
exchange?) 
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JB 
The written documentation has to be provided kept by the taxpayer. It shall only be sent to the 
tax authorities if they ask for it. The documentation has to be in a condition that it is possible 
on the basis of it to establish whether the prices and conditions are in accordance with prices 
and conditions among unrelated. 
Database inquiries shall only be produced if the tax authorities ask for it and with a time-limit 
of 60 days. 
The tax authorities have provided a guideline for the written documentation. In this guideline 
there are thorough descriptions of how the documentation material shall be produced and 
kept. 
25. Choice of transfer pricing method  
The TP Guidelines establish a hierarchy among the three traditional transaction methods 
(comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus and resale minus) and the transactional profit 
methods (transactional net margin method and transactional profit split methods). According 
to the TP Guidelines, the transactional profit methods are last-resort methods, e.g. they should 
be used only in the exceptional situations where there are no data available or the available 
data are not of sufficient quality to rely solely or at all on the traditional transaction methods 
(Paragraph 2.49 of the TP Guidelines). The CUP method is always preferable where it can be 
applied in a sufficiently reliable manner. 
Italy: The tax treatment of transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 110, Paragraph 7 
of the Income Tax Consolidated Act (ITCA). The arm’s length definition contained in this 
provision refers to the concept of “normal value”, which is defined by Article 9 (2) of the 
ITCA. Therefore, Article 9 of the ITCA represents the statutory basis for the determination of 
the arm’s length value of an intra-group transaction. In order to provide guidance on the 
concept of “normal value” arising from Article 9 of the ICTA, the Ministry of Finance issued 
a Circular Letter (32/9/2267 of 22 September 1980) [and Circular letter 42/12/1587 of 12 
December 1981] in which it analytically indicated the methods to be used for each type of 
transaction (e.g. transfer of movable goods, transfer of technology, loans and intra- group 
services) based on the arm’s length principle. Although not legally binding, the Circular is 
generally accepted by the tax authorities and taxpayers, and is considered to be the main 
reference for the interpretation of transfer pricing issues. Such Circular Letters refer to a body 
of rules which have in part been modified but are still extensively applicable and extremely 
important, especially with regard to the methods for determining the normal value, since they 
represent the only instructions of a general nature supplied by the Ministry on the matter.  
Basic Methods: A reading of the above-mentioned Article 9(2) ITCA seems to indicate that 
the comparable price method is the only method the Italian legislator allows to be used for the 
actual application of the transfer pricing system. The Italian Ministry of Finance, the 
prevailing opinion and the case law all concur in the necessity of having recourse to the 
transfer pricing system even when the comparable price method proves not to be applicable. 
In its 1980 Circular Letter the Ministry of Finance  affirmed, in harmony with the indications 
set forth under OECD Reports, that where a comparison between the transaction being 
verified and the sample one is not possible, recourse must be made to the resale price method 
or to cost-plus method. 
Alternative Methods (The Overall Profit Allocation Method; Profit Comparison Method,  
Invested Capital Profitability Method, Economic Sector Gross Margin Method): The use of 
alternative methods, in other words transfer pricing methods other than the basic ones, is not 
provided for by the current legislation as it envisages only the comparable price method. In its 
1980 Circular Letter the Ministry of Finance has, however, allowed that “the application of 
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the basic methods (price comparison, resale price, cost-plus) may not, in some particular 
cases, satisfy the application of the regulations governing Transfer Pricing since frequently 
there are no comparable transactions and just as frequently a reliable comparison between 
independent enterprise is not possible”. Consequently, it was considered advisable that other 
methods suitable for a practical use be taken into consideration in the event that basic methods 
prove inadequate. It is pointed out in the said Circular Letter that in practice the use of such 
methods tends to determine the normal profit rather than the congruity of the transfer price 
and it is specified that alternative methods may be considered useful: i) supplementary, when 
upon verifying the correct application of the three basic methods uncertainties, arise; ii) 
alternatively, when it is absolutely impossible to apply the three basic methods. 
 
Question: Is there a regulatory hierarchy in choosing these methods? Are the transactional 
methods preferred over the profit-based methods? Is the choice based on the nature of the 
goods or service sold? 
 
JB 
The transfer pricing method is in Denmark not regulated in the law but is described in the 
Guidelines for transfer pricing - valuation. In 2009 a new guideline for valuation of business, 
goodwill and other tangible assets was given. 
According to this Guideline there are three methods of evaluation: 
 
1) An income based method where the value is calculated upon the future income arising from 
the object. A DCF (discounted cash flow) method or EVA (economic value added) method is 
often used. 
2) A marked based method where there is a comparison with uncontrolled transactions. In this 
method the value of a peer-group of unrelated companies are found and compared. 
3) A cost based method where the value is calculated based on the cost to build the asset. 
 
In the Guidelines there are descriptions of the use of the different methods. As a principal it is 
up to the taxpayer to choose the relevant method but the choise has to be explained. More 
than one method can be used. 
26. Burden of proof and bilateral conventions 
Potential conflicts may result from a different allocation of the burden of proof in the 
jurisdictions involved in transfer pricing matters: see Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 2009 Para. 4.14 (“When transfer pricing 
issues are present, the divergent rules on burden of proof among OECD Member countries 
will present serious problems if the strict legal rights implied by those rules are used as a 
guide for appropriate behaviour. For example, consider the case where the controlled 
transaction under examination involves one jurisdiction in which the burden of proof is on the 
taxpayer and a second jurisdiction in which the burden of proof is on the tax administration. 
If the burden of proof is guiding behaviour, the tax administration in the first jurisdiction 
might make an unsubstantiated assertion about the transfer pricing, which the taxpayer might 
accept, and the tax administration in the second jurisdiction would have the burden of 
disproving the pricing. It could be that neither the taxpayer in the second jurisdiction not the 
tax administration in the first jurisdiction would be making efforts to establish an acceptable 
arm’s length price. This type of behaviour would set the stage for significant conflict as well 
as double taxation”) and Para. 4.15 (“Consider the same facts as in the example in the 
preceding paragraph. If the burden of proof is again guiding behaviour, a taxpayer in the 
first jurisdiction being a subsidiary of a taxpayer in the second jurisdiction (notwithstanding 
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the burden of proof and these Guidelines), may be unable or unwilling to show that its 
transfer prices are arm’s length. The tax administration in the first jurisdiction after 
examination makes an adjustment in good faith based on the information available to it. The 
parent company in the second jurisdiction is not obliged to provide to its tax administration 
any information to show that the transfer pricing was arm’s length as the burden of proof 
rests with the tax administration. This will make it difficult for the two tax administrations to 
reach agreement in competent authority proceedings”).    
Italy: there are no bilateral conventions containing provisions in this sense. 
 
Question: Given that Article 9 of the OECD Model is silent on the subject of the burden of 
proof, are there bilateral conventions to avoid double taxation that instead contain express 
provisions on the burden of proof in transfer pricing matters? Is this a matter of domestic law? 
 
In Denmark there are no bilateral conventions containing provisions in this sense. 
27. Burden of proof and information exchange procedures 
The tax authorities tend to perform all auditing activities in Italy without reverting to bilateral 
or multilateral procedures available in order to verify and prove their conclusions. For 
example, the lack of comparable data in Italy often leads the tax authorities to abandon the 
CUP method in favour of the cost-plus methods or the other alternative methods which do not 
require investigations outside of Italy. Indeed, practice shows that there are few exceptions to 
this attitude and few situations in which audits are commenced based on information 
spontaneously made available by foreign authorities. 
For example, an assessment which justifies the application of the cost-plus method because of 
the impossibility of finding comparable data may be considered void for lack of proof if it can 
be shown that the tax authorities did not try to find the comparable data through an exchange 
of information with the jurisdiction in the market of destination of the goods. When the tax 
authorities have failed to undertake an exchange of information procedure, tax courts may 
void tax assessments for lack of proof. However it is interesting to note that the Italian tax 
authorities are aware of the risk that a passive approach in carrying out audits of international 
transactions may be considered by a judge as a failure to meet the burden of proof. In Circular 
letter of 21 October 1997 271/E, paragraph 2.3., the Ministry of Finance stressed that 
finalization of assessments concerning the deductibility of head office expenses is appropriate 
only after having taken recourse to the exchange of information procedures aimed at verifying 
whether the costs recharged to the Italian taxpayer were actually borne by the head office and 
if the costs were connected to the business of Italian taxpayer. 
 
Question: Does the national law in your country require prior recourse to an exchange of 
information procedure in order to finalize a tax assessment regarding transfer pricing or a tax 
assessment involving international tax issues in general?  
- In particular, are the tax authorities free to issue assessments based on alleged violations of 
the arm’s length principle without the necessity of previously verifying abroad the 
information and the data which could confirm or void such assessments? 
- What kind of obligations does the taxpayer have to fulfil if the tax authorities request further 
information during this procedure? 
 
JGN 
The Danish tax administration is not generally required to recourse to an exchange of 
information procedure to finalize a tax assessment concerning transfer pricing. The taxpayer’s 
duty to provide documentation which is laid down in the Danish Tax Control Act sec. 3 B and 
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which is further elaborated in the Ministerial Order no 42 of 24 January 200631 may in effect 
have an effect on the burden of proof. If the taxpayer does not produce the required 
documentation, this may in itself be regarded to be in favour of the tax administration as part 
of the general assessment of evidence, cf. the principle in AJA, sec.344 (3) as mentioned 
above. It is, however, important to accentuate, that the Danish tax administration has to make 
probable, that the concerned transaction has not taken place on arms length-conditions: This 
cannot be assumed in general. Naturally, the tax administration also has to contribute as a 
consequence of the inquisitorial procedure principle. The tax administration has instruments 
of sanction among which are the possibility to impose fines in taxpayers who do not meet the 
duty to provide documentation in a deliberate way or with gross negligence, cf. the Danish 
Tax Control Act sec. 17 (3). Furthermore, the tax administration is authorized to conduct an 
estimated tax assessment based on a factual estimate pursuant to the Danish Tax Control Act. 
Sec. 3 B (8) which refers to the sec. 5 (3) of the same act as mentioned above.32 If it is not 
possible for the Danish tax administration to assess the taxpayer’s income without exchanging 
information with the tax authorities of another state, the administration has to verify 
information abroad which is necessary for the estimated tax assessment. 
 
An estimated tax assessment is covered by the normal provisions on complaints procedure in 
Denmark. 
28. Burden of proof in the mutual agreement procedure 
Tax treaties do not provide for the avoidance of double taxation in specific situations. 
Consequently, there is a need for an effective tool to solve disputes among the tax authorities 
of different jurisdictions. Therefore, income tax treaties include a special kind of procedure 
known as the mutual agreement procedure (MAP), which is generally modelled on Article 25 
of the OECD Model Treaty. The great advantage of the MAP for both tax authorities and 
taxpayers is its flexibility and relatively non-bureaucratic nature. 
The taxpayer should be given the right to approach the tax authorities of the two countries 
involved to obtain advance clearance, on the basis of mutual agreement, on the basic elements 
of the transfer pricing system to be followed such as the method to be applied, the selection of 
the data to be used and, if required, adjustments thereto. 
 
Question: What is the taxpayer’s legal position in a mutual agreement procedure?  
 
JGN 
In Denmark, a taxpayer may contact the Danish tax administration to request that the tax 
administration initiate a mutual agreement procedure referring to the relevant article of DTCs. 
I general, it is a condition that the taxpayer will otherwise be subject to taxation contrary to 
the principles of a relevant DTC. No specific formal requirements have to be met concerning 
such a request in Denmark, but the request has to meet certain time frames.33 This option is 
also relevant in transfer pricing cases and in practice the mutual agreement procedure is an 
effective means as tax authorities reach a solution in most situations.34 The procedure requires 
the existence of a provision in a DTC between the two states corresponding to the OECD 
Model Convention art. 25 (1-2). As a main rule and according to most Danish DTCs, the 
request has to be made within three of the first notice about the primary correction. The 
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 Cf. Also the Guidelines about Transfer Pricing, Controlled Transactions and Duty to Provide Information from 
2006. These guidelines are available at www.skat.dk.  
32
 Cf. Anders Oreny Hansen & Peter Andersen: Transfer Pricing i praksis (2008), p. 65-66. 
33
 Cf. Karin Skov Nilausen: Løsning af internationale tvister (2005), p. 131. 
34
 Cf. Anders Oreby Hansen & Peter Andersen: Transfer pricing i praksis (2008), p. 237. 
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Danish tax administration is only obliged to negotiate according to the mutual agreement 
procedure which means that the taxpayer cannot be sure of a result, but it is in practice rare 
that the procedure ends without result.35 
 
A taxpayer’s request to the Danish tax administration for the commencement of a mutual 
agreement procedure should as a minimum contain the following information: 
 
− Identification of the enterprise and other relevant parties (corporations etc) 
− Detailed information about relevant circumstances in connection with the case 
− Identification of the relevant tax periods 
− Copies of notices on tax assessments etc leading to the alleged double taxation 
− Detailed information about complaints and court cases relating to the case 
− An account from the enterprise describing the principles which are infringed according 
to the enterprise 
 
The taxpayer is not allowed to participate in the actual negotiations or to present his or her 
point of view for both competent authorities would require consent from both competent 
authorities. This is considered a weakness of the mutual agreement procedure, because the tax 
authorities also have to represent the taxpayer at the negotiations.36 General principles 
founded in Danish administrative law protect the taxpayer in this respect and ensures that the 
taxpayer is informed about relevant development during the negotiations.  
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 Cf. Karin Skov Nilausen: Løsning af internationale skattetvister (2005), p. 136, where the author refers to 
Mario Züger: General Report in Settlement of disputes in Tax Treaty Law (2002), p. 22, edited by Michael Lang 
& Mario Züger. 
